Abstract
The article supports the thesis that the kind of expert intuition that characterizes chess masters, best sports players, or music virtuosos, is ineffective in some types of legal hard cases. In the scope of psychological research on human expertise, it seems plausible that expert intuition can occur in most legal cases. However, there are legal situations that either generate a completely novel normative issue or create a conflict of colliding legal and moral intuitions. In the first case, there are no visible environmental regularities to adapt, and therefore it is impossible to execute the deliberate practice? a form of training indispensable for achieving expert intuition. The second kind of case? involving a clash of two contrary intuitions? pertains to the situation where two resolutions dictating by expert skills of the same person are mutually inconsistent. Legal expert intuition in both abovementioned states of affair appears to be futile in delivering a determinate answer to a legal problem. The presented analysis, in consequence, indicates the extraordinary possibilities of legal expert intuition, as well as its limitation towards some types of legal hard cases.
References
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35. Hage J. C., R. E. Leenes, A. R. Lodder, Hard cases: a procedural approach, ?Artificial intelligence and law? 1993, nr 2(2), s. 113-167; DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00871759.
36. Haidt J., The emotional dog and its rational tail: a social intuitionist approach to moral judgment, ?Psychological review? 2001, nr 108(4), s. 814-834; DOI: https://doi.apa.org/doi/10.1037/0033-295X.108.4.814.
37. Haidt J., The new synthesis in moral psychology, ?Science? 2007, nr 316(5827), s. 998-1002; DOI: https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1137651.
38. Hambrick D. Z., F. L. Oswald, E. M. Altmann, E. J. Meinz, F. Gobet, G. Campitelli, Deliberate practice: Is that all it takes to become an expert?, ?Intelligence? 2014, nr 45, s. 34-45; DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intell.2013.04.001.
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